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Abstract
This work presents a novel policy iteration algorithm to tackle nonzero-sum stochastic im-
pulse games arising naturally in many applications. Despite the obvious impact of solving
such problems, there are no suitable numerical methods available, to the best of our knowl-
edge. Our method relies on the recently introduced characterisation of the value functions
and Nash equilibrium via a system of quasi-variational inequalities. While our algorithm is
heuristic and we do not provide a convergence analysis, numerical tests show that it performs
convincingly in a wide range of situations, including the only analytically solvable example
available in the literature at the time of writing.
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Introduction
Stochastic impulse games (SIGs) are at the intersection between differential game theory and
stochastic impulse control. In the case of one sole player, they reduce to stochastic impulse opti-
mization problems where an agent seeks to control an underlying (or state variable)—otherwise
governed by a stochastic differential equation—in order to maximise the expected value of some
target functional. One way in which she can influence the underlying is this: whenever it leaves
a continuation region (i.e. at her intervention times), she suddenly shifts it back somewhere
into the region (by providing an impulse). Together, the continuation region and impulses de-
fine what we will call a strategy. Thus, the control-theoretical problem typically boils down
to determining an optimal strategy as a function of the current value of the underlying. The
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purpose of the analysis is to apply that optimal strategy to any specific realization of the under-
lying. When such a strategy is followed, the expected value of the target functional—the largest
possible—is called the value function. This problem is a classical one and it is well understood by
now [ØS09]. In particular, a rigorous framework has been put in place—combining Howard’s al-
gorithm [Bel70,Bel10,How60,BMZ09] with viscosity-capturing finite difference schemes—which
allows for robust numerical approximations [CMS07,CØS02,ØS09].
A natural extension are two-player SIGs. In such games, two players seek to control the
underlying with different, and often opposed, aims. Let us give two concrete examples, due
to [ABC+17].
• Two central banks competing to influence the exchange rate between their respective
currencies, both seeking to devalue their own one. In this application, the exchange rate
is modelled as a stochastic process, and either central bank intervenes when it deems its
currency too strong. Each bank’s strategy is made up of the ensuing devaluation and the
threshold exchange rate triggering it. Both quantities are to be optimally determined in
advance, by solving the game.
• A wholesale producer of energy and a big client of hers who resells it. Due to the high
consumption of the client, both players are capable of affecting the wholesale price of en-
ergy, with naturally opposed targets (a high price versus a low one, respectively). Each
player incurs costs when modifying the price while possibly benefiting from state compen-
sation upon adverse price movements led by the opponent. In order to avoid superfluous
costs, both players need a strategy, based on the current wholesale price, determining the
optimal triggering threshold and the extent of the price shift.
Contrary to one-player SIGs, the value functions in two-player SIGs (one for each player)
cannot be naively defined by maximisation. Instead, optimality can naturally be characterized
via the notion of Nash equilibrium: intuitively, the pair of value functions displays the best
expected outcome in the sense that if a player changes her strategy while her opponent does
not, then the former can only be worse off. A pair of strategies at which these values are
attained is then called a Nash equilibrium. Because of this, two-player SIGs are distinctly
different (and more complex) from one-player SIGs, and the theoretical/numerical frameworks
for the latter are not suitable for the former. This is further accentuated in the so-called
nonzero-sum SIGs (NZSSIGs), roughly meaning that the losses (resp. gains) undergone by one
player may not exactly translate into gains (resp. losses) for the opponent. (For instance, the
previously described examples are best modelled under this very flexible framework.) NZSSIGs
are in contraposition with the simpler and more particular zero-sum SIGs, in which both value
functions add up to zero—effectively reducing the problem to finding one. (This allows for more
natural extensions of the theoretical and numerical tools of the one-player case [Cos13,Bas16].)
Due to the greater complication involved in the analysis, NZSSIGs are much underdeveloped.
Very recently, a breakthrough has been achieved in [ABC+17], where the value functions and
a Nash equilibrium of a very general class of NZSSIGs (assuming they exist and possess some
regularity) have been characterized via a system of quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs). Besides
the theoretical interest of this link by itself, it opens up the possibility of finding approximations
to the value functions by numerically solving that system.
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In this paper, we make the first attempt (to the best of our knowledge) at numerically
solving NZSSIGs. In a nutshell, the iterative algorithm we put forward treats the NZSSIG at
each iteration as a combination of a fixed point problem and a slowly relaxing one-player SIG.
This allows us to take advantage of the machinery for the latter. Because, at the moment, we
lack a proof of convergence, the proposed algorithm is admittedly heuristic. Instead, we report
on a range of numerical experiments, which show convergence of the error with respect to the
discretisation. In fact, errors are quite satisfactory and—in the examples we have tackled—the
relative errors easily drop well below 0.1%. The algorithm can thus be used to assist further
development of the field, as well as to gain insight into applications modelled by NZSSIGs. For
even crafted NZSSIGs with exact solution are hard to construct: in fact, the authors of [ABC+17]
also provide (as far as we know) the first example in the literature—thanks to which we were
able to validate our algorithm in the first place. (For the sake of completeness, this solution
has been included in Section 1.3.) Moreover, this example also evidences that even when an
analytical solution is available, its computation in practice may involve parameters which require
solving complex nonlinear systems of equations—thus stressing the convenience of numerical
approximations.
Let us outline the organization of the rest of the paper. We start in Section 2 by properly set-
ting up NZSSIGs and recalling the main result of [ABC+17], namely, the Verification Theorem
with the corresponding system of QVIs. For the sake of illustration, the concrete application
of competition in energy markets is presented according to this framework. In Section 3, we
briefly review the state-of-the-art numerics for one-player SIGs, with an emphasis on Howard’s
algorithm, which will later become a pivotal ingredient of our own numerical method for NZS-
SIGs. The latter is motivated, listed, and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents numerical
evidence supporting it, in the light of which we draw some conclusions in Section 6.
1 The theoretical model
1.1 Two-player nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games
In this section we introduce a general class of two-player NZSSIG, to which our numerical
algorithm is applicable. For the sake of briefness and pertinence, we will skip some of the most
technical matters of the rigorous construction of the model. We refer the interested reader
to [ABC+17] for more details and a more general modelling framework.
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) be a filtered probability space under the usual conditions, that supports
a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion W = (Wt). For each x ∈ R we consider a process
X (the state variable) starting at x,
Xt = x+
∫ t
0
µ(Xs)ds+
∫ t
0
σ(Xs)dWs +
∑
k: τ1k≤t
δ1k +
∑
k: τ2k≤t
δ2k, (1)
where:
(i) µ, σ : R→ R are Lipschitz continuous.
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(ii) ui := {(τ ik, δik)}∞k=1 (i = 1, 2) is the control of player i, which consists of a sequence of
stopping times τ ik (the k-th intervention time of player i) and Fτ ik -measurable random
variables δik (the k-th intervention impulse of player i).
In words, when none of the players intervenes the state variable behaves as an Itoˆ diffusion.
The players can at any time decide to shift this process by applying a certain impulse. The
specific type of interventions are determined by (threshold-type) strategies, which means that
each player acts only when the state variable exits a given region of R. More specifically, the
control of player i is defined in terms of a strategy ϕi := (Ci, ξi), where Ci ⊆ R is an open set (the
continuation region) and ξi : Cic → R is a continuous function.1 Player i intervenes if X exits
Ci—i.e., if for some t ≥ 0 and ω ∈ Ω it holds Xt(w) /∈ Ci—by applying an impulse ξi(Xt(w)).
We decree that the game never stops and if both players want to intervene at the same time,
then player 1 has the priority. The latter assumption is a matter of convention and not very
restrictive.2
Henceforth, we write Ex to denote the conditional expectation given X0− = x, and define
the objective function for player i given the strategies (ϕ1, ϕ2) and the starting point x of X as
J i(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) := Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρisfi(Xs)ds+
∞∑
k=1
e−ρiτ
i
kφi
(
X(τ ik)−
, δik
)
+
∞∑
k=1
e−ρiτ
j
kψi
(
X
(τ jk)
− , δ
j
k
)]
,
(2)
with i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i; where:
(i) ρi > 0 is the subjective discount rate of player i.
(ii) fi : R→ R is a continuous function giving the running payoff of player i.
(iii) φi : R2 → R (resp. ψi : R2 → R) is a continuous function giving the cost of intervention
(resp. gain due to the opponent’s intervention) for player i.
In addition, we will only consider pairs of strategies (ϕ1, ϕ2) such that the previous expectations
are well defined for all x ∈ R, and we refer to these pairs as admissible (see [ABC+17] for
more details).3 Note for example that, for payoffs with polynomial growth, the ‘no intervention
strategies’ φ1 = φ2 = (R, ∅) are always admissible. In this context, we say that the players
behave optimally if their strategies form a Nash equilibrium. We recall that (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) is a Nash
equilibrium if it is an (admissible) pair of strategies such that, for all (ϕ1, ϕ2),
J1(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2) ≥ J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ∗2) and J2(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) ≥ J2(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ2),
i.e., if player i changes strategy while player j does not, then on average player i will be worse
off, and vice versa. If a Nash equilibrium (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) exists, we define the value function for player
1For any A ⊆ R, Ac denotes the complement of A in R.
2Under the assumptions of the Verification Theorem 1.2.1, the value of the game and the Nash equilibrium
found would not change if player 2 had the priority instead. This can be checked by taking a pair (V˜1, V˜2) as in
the theorem and noticing that (V˜2, V˜1) solves the game in which the structures (costs, gains, rates and payoffs) of
the players have been swapped without swapping the priority.
3In [ABC+17] admissibility is defined pointwise for greater generality. We refrain from doing this for simplicity.
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i when using the strategies (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) by
Vi(x) := J
i(x;ϕ∗1, ϕ
∗
2), i = 1, 2. (3)
Our aim is to compute (V1, V2) for some Nash equilibrium, and more importantly, to retrieve
from these values the equilibrium itself.
1.2 The system of quasi-variational inequalities
In order to establish a system of QVIs for (V1, V2) we need to define one last ingredient, known
as the intervention operators, which will display the effect of each player’s intervention on the
value functions. For any two arbitrary functions V˜1, V˜2 : R→ R, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, and x ∈ R,
the loss operator of player i is given by
MiV˜i(x) := sup
δ∈R
{V˜i(x+ δ) + φi(x, δ)}. (4)
If V˜i = Vi this operator gives the recomputed present value of i due to the cost of her own
intervention. If for each x ∈ R there exists a unique δj(x) = δj
V˜j
(x) that realizes the supremum
in (4) , we also define the gain operator of player i as
HiV˜i(x) := V˜i(x+ δj(x)) + ψi(x, δj(x)). (5)
If V˜i = Vi this operator gives the recomputed present value of player i due to her opponent’s
intervention. Whenever we make use of a gain operator, we are implicitly stating that the above
assumptions and notations are in place. We also emphasize that HiV˜i(x) depends on the whole
function V˜j through δ
j
V˜j
and we will write Hi(V˜j)V˜i(x) instead, when we want to make this
dependence explicit.
We can now state the Verification Theorem, due to [ABC+17], that will allow us to tackle
the problem of finding (V1, V2) and a Nash equilibrium by numerically solving a deterministic
system of QVIs. In the next theorem we use the notation A for the infinitesimal generator of
X when no interventions take place. That is, A is the operator such that if g ∈ C2(S) for some
S ⊆ R, then
Ag(x) = µ(x)g′(x) + 1
2
σ2(x)g′′(x), for x ∈ S. (6)
We concur that whenever we apply A to some function g, we are implicitly stating this function
g is C2 at every x at which we compute Ag(x).
Theorem 1.2.1 (System of QVIs). Let V˜1, V˜2 : R→ R such that for any i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j:
Mj V˜j − V˜j ≤ 0, in R,
HiV˜i − V˜i = 0, in {Mj V˜j − V˜j = 0},
max
{AV˜i − ρiV˜i + fi,MiV˜i − V˜i} = 0, in {Mj V˜j − V˜j < 0} =: Cj , (7)
and V˜i ∈ C2(Cj\∂Ci) ∩ C1(Cj) ∩ C(R) has polynomial growth and bounded second derivative on
some reduced neighbourhood of ∂Ci. Suppose further that (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2), with ϕ∗i := (Ci, δiV˜i), is an
admissible pair of strategies. Then
(V˜1, V˜2) = (V1, V2) and (ϕ
∗
1, ϕ
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium.
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1.3 Example of application: competition in energy markets
We finish this Section by providing a specific example of application: competition in energy
markets [ABC+17].
Let process X model the forward price of energy, evolving as a Brownian motion when there
are no interventions. Consider the following two players: player 1 is an energy producer with
unitary production cost s1, so that in a simplified model her payoff is X − s1. Player 2 runs
a large company that buys from player 1 and sells at a unitary price s2 > s1, with payoff
s2 − X. Because of the high consumption of player 2, she can also affect the price of energy
in the same way as player 1. Whenever these players intervene they incur a cost (advertising
among other factors) which is modelled linearly for tractability—one constant component and
another proportional to the change induced in the energy price. At the same time, because of
their impact in the economy, the government subsidizes upon adverse movements in the energy
price. For each player this represents a gain when the opponent intervenes, which is modelled
in the same way as the cost of intervention, but with different parameters. We further assume
that both players discount their winnings/losses at the same rate ρ > 0 and they have the same
cost/gain parameters. More specifically,
Xt = x+ σWt +
∑
k: τ1k≤t
δ1k +
∑
k: τ2≤t
δ2k
and for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j,
J i(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) := Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρs(−1)i−1(Xs − si)ds−
∞∑
k=1
e−ρτ
i
k(c+ λ|δik|) +
∞∑
k=1
e−ρτ
j
k (c˜+ λ˜|δjk|)
]
,
(8)
where 0 ≤ c˜ ≤ c, 0 ≤ λ˜ ≤ λ, (c, λ) 6= (c˜, λ˜), and 1 − ρλ > 0. These parametric restrictions
ensure among other things the existence of a Nash equilibrium (see [ABC+17] for more details).
The exact solution to this game can be found by application of Theorem 1.2.1. To this
purpose, the system of QVIs (7) is heuristically solved, yielding candidates for value functions
and a Nash equilibrium. This is done, first, by making some educated guesses regarding the
shape of the optimal continuation regions and value functions. Second, by solving the ordinary
differential equations (ODEs) in (7) where appropriate. Finally, by imposing the regularity
requirements of Theorem 1.2.1 through pasting conditions. Upon verification of the remaining
hypotheses, the following turns out to be the solution to the game:
V2(x) =
 ϕ
A1,A2(x∗1) + c˜+ λ˜(x∗1 − x) if x ∈ (−∞, x¯1],
ϕA1,A2(x) if x ∈ (x¯1, x¯2),
ϕA1,A2(x∗2)− c− λ(x− x∗2) if x ∈ [x¯2,+∞),
V1(x) = V2(2s˜− x),
where:
ϕA1,A2(x) = A1e
θx +A2e
−θx +
1
ρ
(s2 − x),
s˜ :=
s1 + s2
2
, θ :=
√
2ρ/σ2, η := (1− λρ)/ρ,
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x¯i := s˜+
(−1)i
θ
log
(√
η + ξ
η − ξ
(√
Γ + 1 +
√
Γ
))
, x∗i := s˜+
(−1)i
θ
log
(√
η − ξ
η + ξ
(√
Γ + 1 +
√
Γ
))
,
Ai := exp
(
(−1)iθs˜
)√η2 − ξ2
2θ
(
(−1)i+1√Γ + 1−
√
Γ
)
,
Γ :=
θ(c− c˜)
4ξ
+
θc(λ− λ˜)
4ηξ
+
λ− λ˜
2η
and ξ ∈ (0, η) is the unique zero of F (y) := 2y − η log
(
η+y
η−y
)
+ θc.
As it can be readily noticed, the analytical solution involves the computation of several pa-
rameters and the resolution of at least one nonlinear equation. As a matter of fact, the number
of parameters in this solution was reduced making use of the symmetry in the problem. In a
more general two-player NZSSIG under the modelling framework of Section 1.1, if we assume
the optimal continuation regions in Theorem 1.2.1 are semi-bounded intervals, then an analyt-
ical solution can easily involve eight parameters: two finite limits of both continuation regions,
two maximising points of the net value functions (subtracting intervention costs) and four un-
determined constants coming from the second order ODEs. Moreover, these parameters are
the solution to a nonlinear system of equations that arises from smooth pasting and optimality
conditions [ABC+17, Def. 4.1.]. In the more frequent than not situation in which this system
cannot be simplified, computing the analytical solution may become prohibitive. This further
motivates the need for a numerical algorithm to solve the system of QVIs (7).
Remark. To the best of our knowledge this is, at the time of writing, the only one example in
the literature of an analytically solvable NZSSIG. Henceforth, we will refer to it as the benchmark
game.
2 Numerics for one-player SIGs: state of the art
Notation. Henceforward, finite grids will be denoted by K and S. For a fixed grid, we will
use the same font type when discretising an operator, e.g., M, H and A will be replaced by
M, H and A. We shall specify later the way the discretisations have been done in our exper-
iments. We will not change notation for functions over grids as their domain will always be
clearly stated. The only exception will be those functions that have been redefined to account
for boundary conditions (BCs). Lastly, we recall that for any set A, RA denotes the set of
functions from A to R.
Policy iteration or Howard’s algorithm for (discrete) variational inequalities (VIs) was orig-
inally developed in [Bel70, Bel10, How60]. The method was then extended to QVIs [CMS07,
CØS02,ØS09], i.e., variational inequalities in which the obstacle depends on the solution itself.
Let K ⊂ R be a finite set (the grid). These problems have the form:
Find V ∈ RK: max{LV (x) + g(x), max
y∈K
ByV (x)− V (x)} = 0 for all x ∈ K, 4 (9)
4Slightly more general formulations are also available.
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where g ∈ RK and L,By : RK → RK are linear and affine operators resp., for each y ∈ K.
Problem 9 encomprises in particular a discrete localized version of a one-player SIG (i.e.,
a stochastic impulse control problem) since the system (7) reduces in this case to one single
QVI. Indeed, by an appropriate finite difference approximation (more details in Section 3) one
can take g = f |K (modified to account for Dirichlet or Neumann BCs),5 A − ρ1Id ≈ L and
M1V˜ (x) ≈ maxy∈K ByV˜ (x), with ByV˜ (x) := V˜ (y) + φ1(x, y − x). By their antisymmetric
structure, two-player zero-sum SIGs can also be accommodated with a similar formulation as a
max-min double obstacle problem [ABC+17, page 7] for one single value function V := V1 = −V2,
and the policy iteration algorithm can be adapted [BMZ09].
However, this framework is not general enough to tackle the NZSSIGs described in Section
1.1 and the full system of QVIs (7). There are, to the best of our knowledge, no available
numerical methods to approach the latter problem. We present now the classical policy iteration
algorithm (Algorithm 1) used to solve (9). It will be embedded in the numerical scheme we will
put forward to solve the much more general problem (7). While we note that our later use of
this algorithm is not fully within the theoretical scope studied in [CMS07]—in particular, we
will need to relinquish the affine nature of the operators By, y ∈ K—the two following main
assumptions will be in place nonetheless (#K is the cardinal of set K):
Assumptions 2.1.1. (i) −L is a strictly diagonally dominant M -operator. That is, if L ∈
R#K×#K is the canonical matrix of L,6 then
Lij ≥ 0 for all i 6= j and − Lii >
∑
j 6=i
Lij for all i.
(ii) By is a non-expansive function for ‖ · ‖∞, for all y ∈ K. That is,
‖ByV˜1 − ByV˜2‖∞ ≤ ‖V˜1 − V˜2‖∞, for all V˜1, V˜2 ∈ RK, y ∈ K.
We remark that, in particular, Assumption (i) will guarantee that Algorithm 1 is well defined,
as the linear operators Lk will be non-singular [BMZ09].
Lastly, note that in Algorithm 1, computing the operators Lk amounts simply to redefining
a matrix row by row, using either the matrix of L or −Id. We have chosen an ‘operators-type’
notation for this paper, as it will simplify matters in the sequel, when compared with its matrix
counterpart.
5For any function F : A→ B and X ⊆ A, F |X denotes the restriction of F to X.
6If K is the grid: x0 < x1 < · · · < xM , then L is the matrix with columns Lj = L1{xj}, for j = 0, . . . ,M .
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Algorithm 1 Policy iteration for one QVI (one-player SIG)
1: Set ε > 0 (numerical tolerance) and kmax ∈ N (maximum iterations).
2: Pick initial guess: V 0 ∈ RK.
3: Let k = 0 (iteration counter) and R0 = +∞.
4: while Rk > ε and k ≤ kmax do
5: Mk := maxy∈K ByV k.
6: αk := 1{LV k+g<Mk−V k} (action at each point).
7: Define Lk : RK → RK and gk ∈ RK by
LkV˜ (x) :=
{
LV˜ (x) if αk(x) = 0
−V˜ (x) if αk(x) = 1 g
k(x) :=
{
g(x) if αk(x) = 0
Mk(x) if αk(x) = 1.
8: Solve for V k+1: LkV k+1 + gk = 0.
9: Rk+1 := ‖V k+1 − V k‖.
10: k = k + 1.
11: end while
3 Proposed algorithm for two-player NZSSIGs
Compared with the single-value-function problems in the previous Section, general two-player
NZSSIGs are distinctly more challenging. The main challenges are:
• two value functions, governed by a system of QVIs, must be solved for,
• the dependence between (V1, V2) is highly nonlinear due to the presence of the gain oper-
ators Hi(Vj)Vi,
• each gain operator is expansive as a function of (V˜1, V˜2); and
• solutions will typically be less regular. For example, if (V1, V2) is the solution to the
benchmark game in section 1.3 then Vi is singular at x¯j for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j (i.e., each
value function is non differentiable at the border of the opponent’s continuation region), in
spite of the game having linear payoffs, costs and gains. This is somehow to be expected,
as Theorem 1.2.1 contemplates this lack of regularity within the smoothness assumptions
(compare to the classical Verification Theorems for one-player problems [ØS09] where
greater regularity is assumed).
Algorithm 2 below is, as far as we know, the first ever numerical attempt at two-player
NZSSIGs. At present, it is admittedly heuristic and supported only by the numerical evidence
reported in Section 4.
The remainder of this Section is organized as follows. We start by explaining the idea and
motivating the underlying heuristics. Then, we describe in detail the discretisation of the system
of QVIs (7). Finally, we list the new algorithm.
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Heuristics. Having discretised the system of QVIs (7), we start from an initial guess
(V 01 , V
0
2 ) to approximate its solution. We seek an iterative procedure to consecutively compute
(V k+11 , V
k+1
2 ), given (V
k
1 , V
k
2 ) at the k-th iteration.
Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. A natural idea is, first, to partition the grid into the ‘approximate
continuation region’ of player j—{MjV kj − V kj < 0}—and its complement, the ‘approximate
intervention region’; and then to compute V k+1i either by calculating a gain as Hi(V kj )V ki in the
former case, or by solving one QVI with Howard’s algorithm (Algorithm 1) in the latter. Note,
however, that naively defining {MjV kj − V kj < 0} as the ‘approximate continuation region’ of
player j poses difficulties.
Indeed, the discretisation of the loss operator Mj as Mj implies that even the true value
function Vj will generally not verify MjVj(x)− Vj(x) = 0 (or MjVj(x)− Vj(x) ≥ 0) for x in the
true intervention region of player j. We therefore need to relax this constraint to account both for
numerical error and the discrepancy between the discrete and space-continuous problems. Our
experiments have shown that a successive relaxation procedure turns out to be the most effective.
Consequently, we define the approximate continuation region of player j as {MjV kj −V kj < −rk}
instead, where rk is a small positive number. By letting rk relax to a preset small tolerance
ε > 0, the iterative approximations will hopefully converge to the correct discrete solution.
It remains to schedule the relaxation procedure and to define a measure of convergence for the
algorithm. Regarding the former, having computed (V k+11 , V
k+1
2 ), r
k is linearly relaxed (line 11).
(This relaxation procedure is chosen for simplicity.). Then the largest pointwise residual to the
system of QVIs (incurred by either approximate value function) is calculated across the grid (line
12), taking into account the numerical tolerance ε. We denote this residual Rk+1 and we consider
the algorithm has converged when it drops below a certain tolerance—unlike in Algorithm 1,
where the residual is taken as the distance between consecutive approximations. This alternative
approach has been chosen for being more informative. It reflects whether a solution to the
discrete system of QVIs has been found—as opposed to the algorithm stagnating—on top of
giving valuable information at each grid node.
By construction, the junctions between the approximate continuation and intervention re-
gions for each of the players will necessarily take place on top of a finite difference node. This
may lead to numerical issues when the exact value functions are non differentiable there (as
will often be the case). Namely, the pointwise residual to the QVIs at the junction nodes may
not be made arbitrarily small by refining the grid—because the derivatives contained in the
residual are not defined at the exact junction, in the first place. In those cases, the algorithm
must be stopped at that point, since adding more grid nodes in a naive way cannot lead to any
improvement.
As a final remark, we mention that numerical experiments show Algorithm 2 does not enjoy
global convergence (i.e. it is not guaranteed to converge from arbitrary initial guesses). Pro-
viding a good enough pair (V 01 , V
0
2 ) is thus a practical issue; in Section 4, a natural way of
constructing educated guesses is explained.
discretisation. Let S ⊆ R be a finite set. S is the grid we will use to discretise the system
(7). In all of the numerical experiments described in the sequel we have taken S as an equispaced
grid of M steps between certain xmin < 0 < xmax with |xmin|, |xmax| and M big enough (more
about this below).
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Let i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, V˜1, V˜2 ∈ RS and x ∈ S. We proceed to define the discretised versions
of the loss and gain operators, over the grid S, as
MiV˜i(x) := max
y∈S
{V˜i(y) + φi(x, y − x)} Hi(V˜j)V˜i(x) := V˜i(yj(x)) + ψi(x,yj(x)− x),
where
yj(x) := min
(
argmax
y∈S
{V˜j(y) + φj(x, y − x)}
)
.
Next, we choose a finite difference scheme for the ODEs
0 = AV˜i − ρiV˜i + fi = 1
2
σ2V˜ ′′i + µV˜
′
i − ρiV˜i + fi
which is consistent, monotone and stable, adding Dirichlet or Neumann-type BCs. In all of our
experiments, we have chosen an upwind finite difference scheme, where
V˜ ′i (x) ≈
V˜i
(
x+ sgn(µ(x))h
)− V˜i(x)
sgn(µ(x))h
V˜ ′′i (x) ≈
V˜i(x+ h)− 2V˜i(x) + V˜i(x− h)
h2
, 7
and V˜i(xmin − h), V˜i(xmax + h) were solved for using Neumann conditions on
V˜ ′i
(
xmin − 1 + sgn(µ(xmin))
2
h
)
, V˜ ′i
(
xmax +
1− sgn(µ(xmax))
2
h
)
respectively. How to get these conditions, and in particular how to choose xmin and xmax, is a
problem-specific question. In some situations, and particularly in the models numerically tested
in this paper, one can heuristically assert that at a Nash equilibrium the continuation region of
player i should be a semi-interval of the form Ci = (xi, xi)—with one end-point finite and the
other infinite. Intuitively, one can further guess that there should exist a unique y∗i ∈ (xi, xi)
that maximises the net value of player i when she intervenes (see, e.g., [ABC+17, Sect. 4.2]
and [Bas16, Sect. 2.3.1]). These conjectures arise mainly from the observation of the payoff
functions f1, f2 which encode the goals of the players and roughly hint at some broad regions
where each player would like the state variable to remain at. On R\Ci and R\Cj one of the two
players will intervene, thus giving either
Vi(x) =MiVi(x) = Vi(y∗i ) + φi(x, y∗i − x) or Vi(x) = HiVi(x) = Vi(y∗j ) + ψi(x, y∗j − x).
If on the interiors (R\Ci)o and (R\Cj)o the derivatives dφi(x,y
∗
i−x)
dx and
dψi(x,y
∗
j−x)
dx exist and do
not depend on y∗i , y
∗
j resp., differentiating the previous relations yields the Neumann conditions
(provided xmin, xmax are ‘extreme’ enough). The previous requirements on the derivatives are
satisfied, for example, if the cost and gain structures have the form φi(x, δ) = gi(x) + ai|δ| and
ψi(x, δ) = hi(x) + bi|δ|, for some differentiable functions gi, hi : R → R and ai, bi ∈ R. For the
benchmark game the Neumann BCs read V ′1(xmin − h) = λ, V ′1(xmax) = λ˜, V ′2(xmin − h) =
−λ˜ and V ′2(xmax) = −λ. We will denote by A the discretised version of A and fi the restriction
of fi to S, redefined at minS and max S to account for the BCs.
7sgn denotes the sign function, i.e., sgn(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0 and sgn(x) = −1 otherwise.
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For Algorithm 2 we recall that given any real number a, a+ denotes its positive part (i.e.,
a+ := max{a, 0}) and for any subset S ⊆ R, 1S denotes the indicator function of S.
Algorithm 2 Policy iteration for system of QVIs (two-player NZSSIG)
1: Set ε > 0 (numerical tolerance), 0 < α < 1, r0 > 0 (relaxation parameters) and kmax ∈ N
(maximum iterations).
2: Pick initial guess: (V 01 , V
0
2 ) ∈ RS × RS.
3: Let k = 0 (iteration counter) and R0 = +∞
4: while Rk > ε and k ≤ kmax do
5: for i=1, 2 (player i) do
6: j = 3− i (player j).
7: Ckj := {MjV kj − V kj < −rk}.
8: For x /∈ Ckj , let V k+1i (x) = Hi(V kj )V ki (x).
9: For x ∈ Ckj , solve for V k+1i (x) by applying Algorithm 1 to
max
{
AV k+1i (x)− ρiV k+1i (x) + fi(x), MiV k+1i (x)− V k+1i (x)
}
= 0.
10: end for
11: rk+1 := max {αrk, ε} (relaxation).
12: Let Rk+1 be the largest pointwise residual to the system of QVIs, i.e.
Rk+1 := max
i,j∈{1,2},j 6=i
x∈S
{(
MiV k+1i (x)− V k+1i (x)
)+
, (10)
∣∣Hi(V k+1j )V k+1i (x)− V k+1i (x)∣∣1Ck,εj (x),∣∣max{AV k+1i (x)− ρiV k+1i (x) + fi(x),MiV k+1i (x)− V k+1i (x)}∣∣1S\Ck,εj (x)},
where Ck,εj := {MjV k+1j − V k+1j < −ε}.
13: Let k = k + 1.
14: end while
Line 9 of Algorithm 2 deserves some special attention. Although at this step we want to
solve a problem restricted to the subgrid K = Ckj (for fixed k, i, j), we still need the information
in S\Ckj in two ways, namely:
• To compute the non-local operators Mi.
• To restrict to K the equation AV k+1i (x)− ρiV k+1i (x) + fi(x) = 0, properly accounting for
the original BCs.
Suppose S is the grid x0 < x1 < · · · < xM and let us identify each point with its respective
index. Let A ∈ R(M+1)×(M+1) be the canonical matrix of A. For any subsets I, J ⊆ {0, . . . ,M},
let us write AI,J for the submatrix of A which has rows indexed in I and columns indexed in
J , and AI,J the associated operator. Put Hki := V
k+1
i |S\K = Hi(V kj )V ki |S\K and hki := maxHki .
Then in order to apply Algorithm 1 we take
LV˜ = AK,KV˜ − ρiV˜ , g = fi|K + AK,S\KHki and ByV˜ (x) = max{V˜i(y) + φi(x, y − x), hki },
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for all V˜ ∈ RK, x, y ∈ K. We remark once again that the functions By fail to be affine
operators. This, together with some assumptions which are not satisfied, make this application
of Algorithm 1 fall outside of the scope of [CMS07] (and even more of [CØS02,ØS09]). However,
it is easy to check that the main assumptions, Assumptions 2.1.1, are still verified under our
discretisation and we have observed unconditional convergence of this subroutine (to very high
orders of precision) in all the experiments we have ran.
Lastly, we note that Algorithm 1 requires setting a numerical tolerance which needs not be
the same as the one of Algorithm 2. In fact, we have always taken it strictly smaller given the
perceived unconditional convergence of the former and its precision.8
4 Numerical results
In this section we assess the performance of Algorithm 2. We shall call the problems considered
in the experiments simply ‘games’. The two value functions V1, V2 are approximated as described
in Section 3 on an equispaced grid of M + 1 nodes, and the computational domain is the plotted
one. In all the subsequent games, ε = 10−8, α = 0.8 and r0 = 1. The largest pointwise residual
(equation (10)) at convergence is denoted by R∞.
As mentioned before, the only NZSSIG for which an analytical solution is currently available
is the benchmark game in Section 1.3. Therefore, we shall eventually focus on that problem.
However, we introduce two other games first (for which we do not have an analytical solution).
They illustrate how the initial guess for the benchmark game can be constructed and provide
further numerical evidence supporting Algorithm 2.
4.1 Parabolic game
This is a version of the benchmark game where the payoff is replaced by a concave parabola
with roots rLi and r
R
i :
fˆi(x) := −(x− rLi )(x− rRi ), rLi < rRi . (11)
Let us motivate this game. We seek to use as initial guess the value functions of the ‘uni-
lateral games’, that is, the control problems in which one of the players never intervenes (her
continuation region is fixed and equal to R). Removing the action of one of the players, however,
may not always lead to a well-posed problem. Indeed, for payoffs without maximum one could
end up for example with ‘infinite-valued value functions’ or ‘infinite-valued optimal impulses’.
This is indeed the case for the benchmark game. Thus, in order to skirt that difficulty it is
convenient to define variations of the benchmark with payoffs that attain a maximum, like (11).
Note that, when well-posed, the unilateral games can be readily solved with Howard’s algorithm
(Algorithm 1).
Figure 1 shows the numerical solution, (V1, V2), to a parabolic game (pair of solid curves)
along with the initial guess (pair of dashed curves). The latter are, in turn, the value functions
of the corresponding unilateral games for players 1 and 2. It is intuitively clear that (V1, V2)
approximate, over the grid, functions which indeed satisfy the assumptions of the Verification
8Note that although precision is assessed in a different way in Algorithm 1, the pointwise residuals to the QVIs
on the corresponding regions are afterwards checked as part of Algorithm 2
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Theorem 1.2.1. The Nash equilibrium exhibited in this Theorem—(ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2)—can be retrieved
from this graph. Indeed, note that in this case the cost for player i is φi = −100 and her
approximate continuation region is {MiVi − Vi < ε} = {maxVi − Vi − 100 < ε}. Further, her
optimal impulse at a given x is the one that realizes (the discrete analogue of) the supremum
in equation (4), which in this case amounts to translating x to the maximising point of Vi.
Consequently, we get ϕ∗1 =
(
(−∞, 1.068),−1.848− x) and ϕ∗2 = ((−3.048,+∞),−0.120− x).
Figure 1: Value functions and Nash equilibrium with parabolic running payoffs: fˆ1 = −(x +
4.5)(x − 1) and fˆ2 = −(x + pi)(x − 2.7). Overlaid, initial guesses (solutions of the respective
unilateral games) Parameters: ρ = 0.03, σ = 0.25, c = 100, c˜ = 30, λ = λ˜ = 0. Here, M = 1000;
check Table 1 for other values.
As it turns out, this parabolic game also converges from the ‘zero guess’ (V 01 = V
0
2 = 0). On
Table 1, the convergence ofR∞ over a wide range of finite difference grids (with 301, 601, . . . , 3001
nodes) is compiled. In all cases, both initial guesses lead to convergence (to within ε) of Al-
gorithm 2. Nonetheless, the algorithm takes in general fewer iterations when starting from the
values of the unilateral parabolic games. (We stress that those on Table 1 are the outer itera-
tions of Algorithm 2. Within each one there is an inner loop of Howard’s iterations. Thus the
computational cost scales linearly with the number of outer iterations.)
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M R∞ its.a its.b
300 1.4×10−12 54 53
600 4.0×10−9 74 77
1200 3.3×10−9 144 77
1800 9.7×10−9 95 77
2400 7.3×10−9 123 77
3000 5.9×10−9 215 103
Table 1: Parabolic game: largest residual to QVIs at convergence (R∞) vs. grid points (M + 1).
Iterations to convergence within ε = 10−8 starting from: zero guess (its.a) and value functions
for one-player games (its.b). (Same parameters as in Figure 1.)
Since the exact solution to the parabolic game is unknown, we cannot say anything about
the convergence of Algorithm 2 in continuous-space. On the other hand, we see the system of
QVIs is (approximately) enforced to within ε 1 by a pair of numerical functions which—also
approximately—comply with the regularity assumptions of Theorem 1.2.1. As such, they are
the (approximate) value functions of the parabolic game.
We conclude this example by illustrating the interplay between the value functions which
numerically solve the system of QVIs, the Nash equilibrium derived from them, and the evolution
of the optimally controlled underlying. Once the optimal strategies (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2) are available, they
can be executed on specific realizations of the game. Sticking to the parameters and numerical
solution in Figure 1, Figure 2 depicts one exemplary trajectory of the underlying in the time
interval 0 ≤ t ≤ 1000, starting from x = 0 and subjected to the pair of optimal strategies. For
numerical purposes, let us define
Jˆ iT (x;ϕ1, ϕ2) := Ex
∫ T
0
e−ρisfi(Xs)ds+
∑
k: τ ik≤T
e−ρiτ
i
kφi
(
X(τ ik)−
, δik
)
+
∑
k: τ jk≤T
e−ρiτ
j
kψi
(
X
(τ jk)
− , δ
j
k
) .
(12)
Intuitively, Jˆ iT (x;ϕ1, ϕ2)→ J i(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) (defined in (2)) as T →∞. In fact, after T & 300, the
integrals in (12) for the parabolic game have essentially attained their asymptotic value. Thus,
we simply take J i(x;ϕ1, ϕ2) ≈ Jˆ iT=1000(x;ϕ1, ϕ2). With this clarification, Figure 3 shows in
particular V1(0) = J
1(0;ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2), V2(0) = J2(0;ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2), V1(−1) = J1(−1;ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2), and V2(−1) =
J2(−1;ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2), obtained by Monte Carlo simulation.9 They compare fairly well with the values of
V1(0), V2(0), V1(−1) and V2(−1) in Figure 1 obtained by our algorithm. (Even better agreement
could be obtained by increasing M in that figure and reducing the discretisation bias and
statistical error of the Monte Carlo simulation, but this is good enough to make our point.)
9The expected values in (12) are approximated by the mean over N = 200 realizations integrated with the
Euler-Maruyama method with time step ∆t = 0.001
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Figure 2: Exemplary trajectory from x = 0 (parameters and solution from Figure 1). The blue
and red dashed lines are the intervention thresholds for players 1 and 2, respectively.
Figure 3: Approximations to the objective functions at x = 0 (solid curves) and x = −1 (dashed
curves), obtained by Monte Carlo simulation (see text for details). Parameters and optimal
strategies from Figure 1. Compare with V1(0), V2(0), V1(−1) and V2(−1) there.
The Nash equilibrium itself can be visually explored in the following way. For a given
starting point x, we keep the optimal strategy for one of the two players, and slightly alter
the strategy of the other one. For concreteness, let us assume that player 1 ”moves” (i.e.
ϕ1 = (1 ± 0.25U)ϕ∗1) while player 2 does not (ϕ2 = ϕ∗2). (U is the uniform distribution, and
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”±” means with equal chance.) Then, we proceed to calculate J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ∗2) by Monte Carlo
simulation as before. By definition of the Nash equilibrium, J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ
∗
2) can not be larger than
V1(x). Within numerical tolerance, this is indeed observed in Figure 4, where the blue empty
circles (representing J1(x;ϕ1, ϕ
∗
2)) do not lie over the blue solid curve (which represents V1(x)).
Full blue circles represent J2(x;ϕ1, ϕ
∗
2): note that the player who sticks to her optimal strategy
may indeed improve over V2(x), should her opponent depart from a Nash equilibrium. (When
player 2 is the one who changes, the red circles and red curve in Figure 4 apply instead.)
Figure 4: Empty blue [red] circles mean that the player 1 [2] has departed from her optimal
strategy while her opponent has not. By virtue of Nash equilibrium, she cannot be (within
numerical errors) better off than V1(x) [V2(x)]. Full circles: objective function of the player who
does not drop her optimal strategy. Parameters and optimal strategies from Figure 1. (Note
that results are subjected to numerical error.)
We stress, however, that Monte Carlo simulations such as those cannot prove that a pair
of strategies form a Nash equilibrium. (At most, they could disprove it.) The only way—in
the current state of the theory—of fully characterizing a Nash equilibrium calls for solving the
system of QVIs—which Algorithm 2 has now made possible.
4.2 Capped benchmark game
In this game, we replace the running payoffs of the benchmark by a version capped at K > 0:
f¯i(x) := min{(−1)i−1(x− si),K} (13)
17
We shall always take K = 5. Once again, the corresponding unilateral games are well-posed and
their solutions can be used as initial guess for the capped benchmark game. As in the previous
example, the capped game also seems to converge from the zero guess. Some convergence
results are compiled in Table 2. Note that convergence falters with M = 600 and M = 3300
(independently of kmax); we will come back to this later.
M R∞ its.
600 — ∞
900 6.5× 10−10 100
1200 8.8× 10−9 124
1500 7.4× 10−9 78
2700 4.1× 10−9 96
3000 6.7× 10−9 125
3300 — ∞
Table 2: Convergence of R∞ in the capped benchmark game using the zero guess. The hyphen
stands for lack of convergence within ε. Same parameters as in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Difference (in absolute value, less than 1%) between the (numerical, with M = 1200)
value functions of the capped benchmark game and those (exact) of the benchmark game—
justifying the former being used as initial guess for the latter. Parameters are: σ = 0.25, ρ =
0.03, c = 100, c˜ = 30, λ = 0.5, λ˜ = 0.3, s1 = −pi/3, s2 = pi/3 and K = 5 (for capped game).
The value functions of the capped benchmark game are a good approximation to those of
the benchmark game itself (see Figure 5). This seems to make sense: due to the action of the
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opponent and for σ  K, the discarded portion of the payoff is not very relevant in practice.
4.3 Benchmark game with educated initial guess
Finally, we tackle the benchmark game, for which an exact solution is available (see Section
1.3). Contrary to the previous examples, Algorithm 2 does not seem to enjoy unconditional
convergence here. In fact, when the zero guess was used, it failed to converge more often than
not (not reported). In order to construct an adequate initial guess, we first solve for the value
functions of the capped benchmark game. Using them as the initial guess, convergence was
achieved in every experiment.
Figure 6: Value functions and Nash equilibrium of two instances of benchmark game. Initial
guess: solutions of capped benchmark games (K = 5). Overlaid, error of the initial guess.
Parameters: ρ = 0.02, σ = 0.15, s1 = −3, s2 = 3, c = 100, c˜ = 0, λ = λ˜ = 15, M = 1000 (left);
ρ = 0.03, σ = 0.25, s1 = −2, s2 = 2, c = 100, c˜ = 30, λ = 4, λ˜ = 3, M = 1000 (right).
The result of two experiments are plotted on Figure 6. The numerical approximations can
hardly be distinguished from the exact solutions with the naked eye. As it was done with the
parabolic game, once again we can retrieve an approximate Nash equilibrium from the numerical
solution. For the left figure, this is ϕ∗1 =
(
(−2.82,+∞), 1.53−x) and ϕ∗2 = ((−∞, 2.82),−1.53−
x
)
. When compared with the exact equilibrium, the errors on the corresponding abscissae are
smaller than 0.15, i.e., smaller than half the grid step.
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M R∞ |error| its.
500 3.8×10−10 0.687 126
1000 1.2×10−9 0.805 154
1500 7.2×10−9 0.512 157
2000 3.5×10−9 0.365 172
2500 — — ∞
Table 3: Convergence of Algorithm 2 for benchmark game. Same parameters as in Figure 6
(left).
M R∞ |error| its.
600 — — ∞
800 9.5×10−10 0.023 183
1000 3.7×10−9 0.330 177
1400 8.7×10−9 0.196 159
1800 6.8×10−9 0.121 226
2200 5.6×10−9 0.073 224
2600 — — ∞
Table 4: Convergence of Algorithm 2 for benchmark game (same parameters as in Figure 6
(right).
On Tables 3 and 4, the convergence of the numerical approximation provided by Algorithm 2
to the true solution is demonstrated. However, R∞ fails to drop below ε for a fine enough dis-
cretisation. This reflects a pattern: R∞ stagnates as M grows. Upon closer inspection, it turns
out that the stagnating largest pointwise residual for each player takes place at the junction be-
tween the intervention and continuation regions of the opponent, where the exact value function
of the former player has a singularity (a kink). As discussed in Section 3, Algorithm 2 is always
going to place those kinks at finite difference nodes. The overshooting residuals are thus due to
the inability of a numerical solution to reproduce a sharp, nonsmooth feature—where the finite
difference derivatives grow unbounded as the distance between nodes goes to zero. Figure 7
illustrates this situation. It can be seen that errors continue to be acceptable (far less than 1%
relative error in the worst case). We also highlight the fact that the kinks do not seem to bring
about oscillations of the numerical solutions around them—the notorious Gibbs’ phenomenon.
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Figure 7: Stagnation of accuracy: the pair with M = 1983 is fully converged (within numerical
tolerance); the pair with M = 1984 (overlaid) is not. The insets zoom in on both pairs of
functions. Parameters: ρ = 0.02, σ = 0.15, s1 = −1, s2 = 1, c = 100, c˜ = 30, λ = 4, λ˜ = 3.
5 Conclusions
We have designed and tested a novel policy iteration algorithm—the first one as far as we know—
to numerically solve nonzero-sum stochastic impulse games (NZSSIGs). The approach consists
in solving a system of quasi-variational inequalities which characterizes the value functions and
Nash equilibrium, exploiting a recent theoretical breakthrough in [ABC+17].
Our algorithm computes iteratively the approximate solution by partitioning, for each of the
players, the discretised spatial domain into an approximate continuation region and an approx-
imate intervention region. They are defined through a relaxation parameter that evolves along
the iterations. In the continuation region, we solve one quasi-variational inequality by means
of (a generalization of) Howard’s algorithm, whereas in the complement, a gain is computed.
A strategy for producing an educated initial guess to start the iterations—which relies on solv-
ing two associated, standard impulse control problems—has been presented along with the new
Algorithm as well.
We have not carried out a convergence analysis. Instead, we have gathered plenty of nu-
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merical evidence showing that the Algorithm can be applied confidently. In particular, we have
performed convergence tests on the only available—at the time of writing—example of an ana-
lytically solvable NZSSIG. In other test NZSSIGs for which we do not have an analytic solution,
we have explored consistency and numerical results on the value functions and Nash equilibrium,
also with satisfactory results.
Value functions of NZSSIGs can develop sharp kinks at the confluence between the contin-
uation and the intervention regions of the opponent. Capturing such features into numerical
approximations is a pervasive challenge of numerical analysis. Numerical tests show that the
presence of such kinks may eventually put a cap to the accuracy attained by our algorithm.
On the other hand, its stability is not affected by them. Moreover, in every case the largest
pointwise error was perfectly acceptable for the purposes of most applications.
In sum, the new Algorithm offers a means of gaining quantitative insight into applications
modelled by NZSSIGs. Natural continuations of the present work include the convergence analy-
sis of the Algorithm, and enriching the discretisation method so as to better capture singularities
in the solutions.
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